A key feature of many malware infections, including the multi-step attacks described above, is the subversion of legitimate (also called benign) processes that aren't confined by strict policies. Thus, rather than focusing on untrusted process confinement, our research focus has been on isolating benign processes from untrusted data and code. In addition to restricting the execution of untrusted code by benign processes, our approach also restricts benign processes from consuming any data that resulted (in part or whole) from an untrusted process. As a result, there can be no causal relationship between the actions of a benign process and those of untrusted malware.
One approach we have developed is based on the concept of one-way isolation, where information can flow freely from benign applications (or data) to untrusted applications, but the reverse flow is blocked. In particular, all data created or modified as the result of executing an untrusted application are contained within our safe-execution environment (SEE), and is inaccessible to benign applications. SEEs are not only suitable for trying out untrusted software, but have several other interesting applications, including testing of software patches and upgrades, penetration testing, and testing out new software configurations. Our SEE enables these tasks to be performed safely, and without disrupting the operation of benign servers and desktop applications that are running outside the SEE. Moreover, if the result of an SEE execution is determined to be safe by an user, he or she may commit the results so that they become visible to the rest of the system. We have developed simple and effective criteria to ensure system consistency after a commit.
Although our SEE is effective in restricting information flows without affecting the usability of untrusted applications, there is one problem it cannot solve by itself: users need to decide whether the results of untrusted execution are "safe" to be committed to the host system. We have explored ways to automate this step. In its most basic form, this automation is achieved by encoding the safety criteria in the form of a program, and by permitting this (trusted) program to examine the state inside the SEE. If the SEE state is determined to be safe, then its contents are committed, as mentioned before. We point out that a policy enforcement mechanism that combines isolated execution with postexecution state examination is more powerful and flexible than a traditional behavior confinement mechanism. In particular, behavior confinement policies need to be written so that every permitted operation leaves the system in a safe state. In contrast, our hybrid approach allows the system to go through intermediate states that are unsafe. For instance, we can permit an execution that deletes a critical file and recreates it, provided the recreated content is equal to the original content (or contains some permitted modifications). In contrast, a traditional behavior confinement system would require aborting the execution at the point the application attempts deletion of the critical file.
We then considered the special but important case of verifying the safety of software installations. Since software installations normally require high privileges, they are a favorite target for malware writers. If malware can trick a user into permitting it to be installed, then, by utilizing the administrative privileges that are available during the installation phase, malware can embed itself deeply into the system. We have developed an approach that can automatically identify the correctness criteria for an untrusted software installation, and verify it after performing the installation within an SEE. Our technique has been implemented for contemporary software installers, specifically, RedHat and Debian package managers.
Most recently, we have been investigating an approach that performs comprehensive information-flow tracking across benign and untrusted applications. The advantage of such an approach is that it can altogether avoid the question of what is "safe." Instead, data that is produced (or influenced) by untrusted applications are marked, and any process (benign or untrusted) that consumes such data is confined by a policy. Moreover, outputs of such processes are also marked as untrusted. Although the concept of information-flow based integrity is very old, its practical application to contemporary operating systems has not had much success. Guided by our experience with SEEs, we have developed an effective and efficient implementation of this approach for contemporary operating systems, specifically, recent versions of Ubuntu Linux. This talk will conclude with a description of our approach, and our experience in using it.
